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A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus 
for lnferentialist Expressivists 
ULF HLOBIL1 
Abstract: I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic 
consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex lan-
guage. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) log-
ical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by 
the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence re-
lation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional 
connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator 
that marks implications that hold monotonically. Transitivity fails, but for 
good reasons. lntuitionism and classical logic can easily be recovered from 
the system. 
Keywords: nonmonotonic logic, sequent calculus, logical inferentialism, 
logical expressivism, material consequence relation 
1 Philosophical motivation 
What follows is motivated by two big philosophical ideas: logical inferen-
tialism and logical expressivism. Logical inferentialism is a view about the 
meaning of logical vocabulary. Very roughly, it says that the meaning of 
logical vocabulary is settled by its inferential role, i.e., by what implies and 
is implied by sentences in which such vocabulary occurs. Logical expres-
sivism is a view about the expressive function of logical vocabulary, i.e., 
a view about what such vocabulary is for, what it allows us to do. Very 
roughly, the view is that logical vocabulary allows us to explicitly undertake 
commitments regarding inferential goodness and incoherence by asserting 
logically complex sentences, whereas without logical vocabulary we could 
undertake such commiunents only implicitly by reasoning or arguing in cer-
tain ways. It is part of this idea that we can introduce logical vocabulary 
1The work I am presenting here comes out of joint work with Roben Brandom and hb 
research group on nonmonotonic logic. So my debt to Roben Brandom and the other members 
of the group can hardly be overestimated. I also want to thauk the panicipanL~ of the Logica 
2015 conference for invaluable comments and discussion. 
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purely in terms of a material consequence relation and incoherence prop-
erty over a language that does not include logical vocabulary. I shall present 
a logical system that exemplifies logical inferentialism and logical expres-
sivism. The system introduces logical vocabulary in terms of its inferential 
role, and it does so on the hasis of material consequence and incoherence. 
The perhaps biggest challenge for such a project is that material, nonlogi-
cal consequence and incoherence are virtually always nonmonotonic. Non-
monotonicity, however, is notoriously difficult to deal with in formal sys-
tems. In this section, I want to explain the basic ideas just mentioned. 
1.1 Logical inferentialism 
Let's begin with logical inferentialism. This is the view that the meaning of 
logical vocabulary is a matter of its inferential role (for a recent exposition 
and defense see Peregrin, 2014). Gentzen (1934, p. 189) fonnulated aver-
sion of the idea when he famously said that the introduction rules of a bit 
oflogical vocabulary constitute, "as it were, the 'definitions' of the symbols 
concerned." The version of the idea that will be relevant here, however, is 
closer to Dummett's (1991, p. 247) view that the "meaning of [a} logical 
constant[.,.} can be completely determined by laying down the fundamen-
tal logical laws governing it" (see also Kneale, I 956, pp. 254-55). For our 
current purposes, we can think of logical inferential ism as the idea that the 
meaning of a bit of logical vocabulary is fully determined by the full set of 
implications or good arguments in which it occurs. Hence, we can introduce 
such vocabulary into a language by giving rules that determine the conse-
quence relation over the logically extended language. Below I will provide 
such rules in the form of a sequent calculus. 
Logical inferentialism has been criticized in various ways. Entering such 
debates here would take us too far afield. The only point that will matter for 
me is so-called "conservativeness." Prior (l 960) famously pointed out that 
one can introduce connectives, like his "tonk," that trivialize a consequence 
relation by laying down introduction and elimination rules. Supposing that 
such connectives are meaningless, this can seem to undermine inferential-
ism because it shows that not all rules that specify an inferential role specify 
a meaning. In response to this worry, most inferentialists follow Belnap 
( 1962) and say thal the rules by which we introduce a new bit of logical 
vocabulary must extend the consequence relation we start with in a conser-
vative manner. That is, an implication that does not contain the new bit of 
vocabulary holds in the extended consequence relation just in case it already 
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held in the unextended consequence relation. I accept this as a restriction 
on the rules we can use to introduce logical vocabulary. Many more such 
restrictions have been proposed in the literature, such as various versions of 
harmony and separability. However, I will ignore such further restrictions 
here and shall be content with the safeguard that conservativeness provides 
against 'tonk-like' connel:tives. 
1.2 Logical expressivism 
I am taking the idea of logical expressivism from Robert Brandom (together 
with whom I have developed the ideas presented here). Brandom builds 
on Frege's idea that his "'concept-script is a fomial language for the ex-
plicit codification of conceptual contents" (Brandom, 2000, p. 58). If one is 
(with Brandom) an inferentialist across the board and not just regarding log-
ical vocabulary, one believes that all (non-logical) conceptual contents are a 
matter of material consequence and incoherence. On this view, Frege 's idea 
is that the concept-script is a fonnal language for the explicit codification of 
material consequence and incoherence. Hence, the expressive function of a 
fom1al language is to let us talk 'about' material implication relations and 
incoherence properties.2 Brandom sometimes puts this view in a slogan by 
saying that logic "is the organ of semantic self-consciousness" (Brandom, 
2009, p. 11 ). 
Logical expressivism would need a lot of unpacking, but for our pur-
poses, we can simplify the idea to the claim that, for any well-behaved lan-
guage, logical vocabulary can be introduced solely in tem1s of the material 
consequence relation and incoherence properly of the unextended language, 
and the so introduced logical vocabulary allows us to make explicit this con-
sequence relation and incoherence property within the object language. 
Definition 1 Logical expressivism is the thesis that (i) logical vocabu-
lary can be introduced into any language with a well-behaved material 
consequence relation and incoherence property solely in terms of this con-
seqCtence relation and incoherence property, and (ii) the thus introduced 
vocabulary allows us to form semences that make explicit facts about the 
underlying (and also the extended) comeq11e11ce relation and incoherence 
property. 
2Notice that. given logical infcrcncialism, the '"ahout" here must nol (or not primarily) he 
understood in representationalbl terms . 
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For us, the first point concerns the raw materials that we start with: a 
material consequence relation and incoherence property defined over a lan-
guage without logical vocabulary. 
The second point is more difficult to understand. It concerns what we 
want to built from the basic material: we want to build logical expressions 
that fulfill their expressive job of making explicit consequence and incoher-
ence. Now, when can a hit of vocabulary count as "making explicit" the 
material consequence relation and incoherence property'? This is easiest to 
grasp for the two logical expressions that I take to be paradigmatic: the 
conditional and negation. In the system I will present below, the conditional 
makes explicit--or tracks-consequence, and the negation makes explicit-
or tracks-incoherence. For the conditional, this means that a conditional 
A ~ B is implied by a premise-set just in case B is implied by the result of 
adding A to this premise-set, i.e., a deduction theorem holds. For negation, it 
means that the negation -,A is implied by a premise-set just in case adding A 
to this premise-set results in something incoherent. So logical expressivism 
puts constraints on the conditional and negation that are acceptable for us. 
1.3 Nonmonotonicity 
Brandom and Aker have already provided a system in which logical vocab-
ulary is introduced solely in terms of a material incoherence property over 
sets of atomic sentences (Brandom, 2008, pp. 141-175). One crucial limi-
tation of tbis so-called "incompatibility semantics" is that it's consequence 
relation is monotonic, i.e., if a set of sentences implies, say, the sentence A 
then so do all its supersets (see lemma 2.1 on p. 143 of Brandom, 2008). 
This is a limitation because, according to inferentialist expressivism re-
garding logic, material inferences are not just enthymematic formal infer-
ences. If we take such inferences at face value, however, it is hard to see 
how their nonmonotonicity could be merely apparent. Moreover, paradig-
matic material implications, such as implications in legal matters, medicine, 
or morality, are virtually always defeasible. And the same bolds for material 
incoherence. Sets of commitments that don '1 fit together can hecome jointly 
acceptable once we add another commitment into the mix. 
Is there perhaps another off-rhe-shelf logic that suits the infcrentia]ist 
expressivists as an exemplification of her ideas? Unfortunately, it does not 
seem so. There are many nonmonotonic logics on offer today (for an in-
troductory overview see Antonelli , 2008). But, as far as I know, none of 
them uses a material consequence relation and incoherence property as their 
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starting point. In fact, many nonmonotonic logics treat some logic- often 
classical logic-and its vocabulary as given and freely available in the new 
logic. Moreover, most nomnonotonic logics obey some version or Cut. As 
we will see below. this means that they cannot have a conditional that is in 
line wich logical expressivism, i.e., they cannot have a deduction theorem. 
If logical infercntialism and logical cxpressivism are good ideas and we 
take the nonmonotonicity of material consequences seriously, there should 
be formal systems that exemplify these ideas in a paradigmatic way. Thus, 
we want a way of conservatively extending a nonmonotonic material con-
sequence relation and incoherence properties such that the conditional and 
negation track consequence and incoherence, respectively. 
2 The basic setup 
As l explained in the previous section, our motivating philosophic.al ideas 
are. firstly, that the meaning of logical vocabulary is determined by ics infer-
ential role and, secondly, thac logical vocabulary makes explicit features of 
an underlying, nonmonotonic, material consequence relation and incoher-
ence property. So we must start with a material consequence relation and 
incoherence property over a language that docs not contain logical vocab-
ulary. Call chis language 2'0-. We can think of 2'10 _ as a set or atomic 
sentences, {p1 , ... ,pn}· Some subsets of i'.'-'o- materially imply somc sen-
tences in 2 0 _ . And some subsets of 2'0 _ are materially incoherent. So 
the structures that we start with are triples or (a) an atomic language, (b) 
a (single conclusion) consequence relation over iL, and (c) an incoherence 
property defined over sets of atoms. 
In order to express incoherence and consequence in a unified way, we 
introduce the constant" .l." Let 2'10 = ~J- U { ..L }. Let f---0 be the relation 
over 2'o such that {Pk , ... ,pi} f'vo p; iff {Pk· ... , pi} materially implies 
Pi and, moreover, such that r f'vo .l iff r is materially incoherent.3 The 
constant ..L cannot occur on the left of the snake-turnstile and it cannot be 
embedded. We used it merely to encode the incoherence property into the 
"underlying consequence relation;" so f'vo ~ P(2'0 __ ) x 2 0 . We say that a 
consequence relation f--- 0 is proper just in case (a) the whole atomic language 
is incoherent (2'0- f'vo..L), (b) the empty set is coherent (0 ffo..L), (c) f'vo is 
31 use capital Greek letters for sets of sclltcnccs, lower t:a'e Latin letter' for atomic 'en-
tenccs. and upper case Latin letters for arbitrary sentences. l will omit the 'et-brackds on th~ 
left of the snake-turnstile if no confusion cnn ari>c. 
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reflexive (VT s:;; 2'0- (p E r ==> r f-vo p)), and (d) ~o obeys what we call 
"Ex Falso Fixo Quodlibct" (ExFF): 
ExFF For any atom p, if'\/ ti. s:;; 2'0- (f , ti. f-vu1-), then r f"vo p. 
This principle is a variant of ex falso quodlibet, i.e., explosion. Notice that 
the difference between the traditional version of ex fa/so and ExFF only 
shows up in a non monotonic context. After all, r f-v0 1- guarantees V ti. ~ 
.2'0 _ (r , ti. f-v0 1-) if monotonicity holds for f"v 0 . 
Let's sum up our starting point in two definitions. 
Definition 2 Base Structure: A base structure is a pair (£0 , f-vo) such 
that (i) 2"o is a set of atomic sentences, {pi, ... , Pn} = .2"o_, and the 
symbol 1-, and (ii) f-vo is a material consequence relation that also encodes 
an incoherence property, f-vos:;; 'P(£'o_) x 2'o. 
Definition 3 Proper Base Structure: A base structure is proper iff its 1111-
derlying consequence relation, f-vo. is prope1; i.e., if it satisfies the following 
conditions: (a) 2'0- f-vo 1-. (b) 0 ffoJ.. (c) f"vo is reflexive, and (d) ExFF. 
All base structures I will talk about are proper base structures. Our goal 
is to extend arbitrary proper base structures to structures with a language, 
£', that contains logical vocabulary and a consequence relation, f-v, over 
this extended language. Moreover, this extension should be such that, firstly, 
we introduce logical expressions by giving rules that determine their roles 
in the extended consequence relation. This is the logical inferentialism. 
And secondly, the so introduced logical vocabulary should make explicit 
features of the consequence relation into which it is introduced. That is the 
logical expressivism. As already intimated, for our purposes, the second 
point amounts to two desiderata: the extended consequence relation should 
satisfy, the Deduction Theorem (DT) and what I shall call the "Negation 
Theorem" (NT): 
DT r r- A ~ B ~ r, A 1 ...... n. 
NT r f-v -.A ~ r, A f-vJ.. 
If DT holds, the conditional is tracking the consequence relation. Such a 
conditional allows us to not only practically acknowledge that B fo llows 
from A in the context of r by inferring B from A in the context of [, but 
to assert something on the basis of r chat commits us to B fol lowing from 
A, in the context of r. Similarly, if NT holds, the negation is tracking the 
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incoherence property. Such a negation allows us to assert something on 
che basis of I', that commits us to f being incompatible with A (i.e., they 
being jointly incoherent). That is the sense in which such a conditional and 
negation make explicit the consequence relation and incoherence property 
of the language in which they occur. 
There are cwo further desiderata for the extension of the underlying con-
sequence relation. First, as explained above, we want the extension to he 
conservative, i.e., if r ~ ~o- and A. E 2 0 , then r f--- A iff r f-vo A. 
Second, we want the extension to preserve reflexivity, i.e., if the buse con-
sequence relation is reflexive, the extended one must be so, too. 
Let's sum up the goal that I shall pursue in the reminder of this paper: 
GOAL We want to find a way to extend any proper base structure in 
such a way that the exrension, {2, f-v), is conservacivc, pre-
serves reflexivity, and oheys DT and NT. 
Notice that the conservativeness of the extension means that the extension 
must not force monotonicity. After all, a nonmonotonic consequence rela-
tion cannot be extended conservatively to a monotonic consequence relation. 
As a bonus, I will also introduce a new modal operator, 0 . This opera-
tor marks consequences that hold monotonically. In order to see what this 
means, notice that even in a consequence relation where monotonicity fails 
as a global property, there can be sets of sentences, r, such that r and every 
superset ofic imply a certain sentence A, i.e., 'Vfl ~ s;:'_ (fl, r f-v A). Thus. 
the implication r f-v A behaves monotonically. I will introduce an oper-
ator that tracks this property of implications in the object lunguage. More 
precisely, the operator will obey the following principle. 
BOX r f-v DA iff'Vfl ~ ,2_ (fl, r f-v A). 
I will sometimes call this operator the ··monotonicity-box." Having such 
an operator is not necessary for a logical system that exemplifies the ideas 
of logical inferentialism and logical expressivism in a nonmonotonic set-
ting. In so far as regions where monotonicity holds locally are of interest, 
however, having such an operacor is desirable. 
3 The construction 
In the previous section, I explained that we want to extend a material con-
sequence relation to a language, .:t', with logical vocabulary. The extended 
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language I shall use includes negation, a conditional, conjunction, disjunc-
tion, and the new kind of modal operator mentioned in the previous section. 
The syntax of the language without J_ is straightforward. 
Syntax oLZ'-'_: 'P : := p I --.cp I 'f' ->- ip I ;,p&c.p I 'P V rp I Dp 
And p is an atomic sentence of !L'_ iff p E 2 0 _. We now define the 
extended language as 2' = !L'_ u{ 1-}. 
Extending the consequence relation to r- s.::; P(.ii'_) x 2' is more tricky. 
We do this by way of a sequent calculus in which the material implica-
tions serve as axioms. I call it the Non-Monotonic Modal sequent calculus 
(NMM). 
We start wich the straightforward idea that whatever is in the underlying 
consequence relation, r-0 , is an axiom of the sequent calculus. However, 
there is a complication that has to do with our monotonicity-box. Our se-
quent calculus does not only have one kind of turnstile but IP(P(2'o)) I 
many turnstiles. The idea is that, for every subset X of P(!L'0 ), we want to 
haver r-tx A just in case\:/ 6 E X (6, r r- A). We stipulate this for the 
axioms of our sequent calculus and, hence, get axioms with different kinds 
of turnstiles. 
Here is how we construct the extended consequence relation, r-. First, 
we have two clauses that provide us with axioms of our sequent calculus. 
Axioms ofNMM: 
Ax!: IfI' r-0 A, then r r- A is an axiom. 
Ax2: If X s.::; P(.:£0 ) and \f6 E X (6, r r-0 A), then r f-vtx A is an 
axiom. 
Convention: If X = P(.:£0 ), we can writer r-p: A as r r.-t A. 
A sequent is in f-v just in case it can be derived from these axioms in a 
proof-tree using only the following sequent rules: 
Rules of NMM: 
Note on the notation: What is on the left of the turnstile are sets of formu-
lae. The comma is to be read as set-union with flanking individual formulae 
being read as in set brackets; e.g., 'T, A" on the left means 'TU {A}". Up-
ward arrows and fotmulae in square brackets are optional. That is, both, the 
sequent with and the sequent without the bracketed upward arrow, are deriv-
able via the rule. Some rules are presented as involving ordinary sequents, 
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i.e. f-v- type sequents, but they also apply to quantified sequcnts, i.e. f-vtx -
type sequents. That is, they should be read as systematically ambiguous 
in the following way. Ordinary scquents can be replaced by quanitificd se-
quems in unified ways. I.e. the rule can be applied if all the f-v-typc turnstiles 
in the premises and the conclusion are replaced hy r.-tx -type turnstiles with 
the same X in all of these premises and the conclusion. 
f ,A f-v B 
------CP 
r f-v A---+ B 
CCP 
f,.41, .. .,A,.1"--1 B r,Bf'-i.41 r,Bf'-iA,, r.Cf---D 
------------------------'-~LC 
r. A1 .... , A ,,, H ---t C f--- D 
f ,A f-v..L 
r f-v -.A 
RN 
f , A,B f-vC 
-----L& 
r,A&B f-v C 
r ,Af-vC f,Bf-vC 
r,A v B , [A], [B J f-v C 
ff-viA 
r f-v DA 
RB 
r f-vtA 
r, B---+ C f-v [ti A 
CK 
r f-v tx A r f-v tY A 
r f-v t x uY A 
Lv 
UN 
ff-vA 
--- --LN 
r. ....,A 1-v ..L 
rr.-A rf-vB 
-------R& 
f f-v A&B 
r 1-vA 
r ,..., A v B Rvl 
r r- n 
f f-vAVB 
Rv2 
r,A r.- n 
LB 
r , DA f-v B 
rf-v t A r r.-r_J_ 
r ,-.B f-v [t!A NK r r.- [tlA Ell.FF 
r, P1 ... Pn f-v A 
Push Up 
r f-v t{(p, .. p,. }} A 
These sequent rules define a consequence relation f-v ~ P (.5!'_) x .:tJ. 
They also define many "quantified consequence relations" of the f-v tX -type. 
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The purpose of the latter ones is merely auxiliary. They allow us to introduce 
the monotonicity-box, to use ExFF as a rule, and to use rules like LC, CK 
and NK for our conditional and negation. In this way, quantified scquents 
inOuence the extension off---- indirectly. 
This construction gives us an extension of hase structures: (-2f, f----/. We 
now have to show that this extension satisfies the requiremenL<; set out in 
GOAL and BOX above. 
4 Properties of the extension 
Given GOAL and BOX above. we want the extended consequence relation 
to have the following properties: 
I . ~is well defined. 
2. ~ is reflexive-Le. 'v'f ~ 51'_ (A Er::::} r ~ A)-if ~o is reOexive. 
3. ~is a conservative extension of ~o. i.e., for all A E 2"o and r ~ 2'0 , 
r ~o A iff r ~ A. 
4. OT holds, i.e., r ~A-+ B iff f , A~ B. 
5. NT holds, i.e., f ~ ~A iff r , A ~.L 
6. BOX should hold, i.e .. r ~DA iff'v'A ~ 51'_ (f , A ~A). 
Two remarks arc in order: first, I restrict all these claims to finite premise 
sets; and I will assume that the hase language is finite. I will not worry about 
compactness. This is a restriction of the current approach that I hope can he 
lifted for future descendants of it. Second, due to limitations of space I can 
only sketch the proofs of these properties. And sometimes I will omit proofs 
e ntirely.4 
Restricting ourselves to finite premise sets, the first of these claims can 
easily be seen to be true because we only add sequents to our consequence 
relation. Since we never explicitly require something to not be in the rela-
tion, we cannot contradict ourselves. If we can show 1·hat our extension is 
conservative, this will also show that our consequence relation is not trivial, 
i.e., that it docs not hold between every premise set and every formu la. So 
let's lo.ok that conser vativeness and the preservation of reflexivity. 
~Contact me for detailed vcr> ion~ of the proofs. 
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4.1 Preservation of reflexivity and conservativeness 
In order to show that reflexivity is preserved and that the extension is con-
servative, we first need some lemmas. 
Lemma 1 If Pt, .... Pn· f f-v A. then f f-vH { P• ... JJ,.} } A. 
Proof Immediate from PushUr. D 
Lemma2 /f V6~!t'- (6.ff-vA),the11r:-vt A. 
Proof Suppose that Vt::. (6, r f--- A). This implies V6 ~ -~o- (6, f r.-
A). So, for every suhsct of our atoms, {Pt ... Pm}, we have P1 ... Pm, f f---
A. So. by lemma I, f r.-t{ {Pi ... p.,,}} A. By 21.:c.,· arrlications of UN. we 
get r r.-t A. o 
Next, we need a lemma that says that if we can weaken a sequent with 
arbitrnry sets of atoms, then we can weaken it with arbitrary sets of formu-
lae. 
Lemma 3 If Vt::.~ !t'o- (t::. , r r- A). then Vt:. ~ .~- (t::., r I"-' A). 
Proof By induc.:tion on the complexity of the most complex formulae in 
6, where complexity is the number of connectives in a formula. The base 
case is immediate. for the induction step, take an arhitrary set, e. with the 
maximally complex formulae in it being of complexity n+ 1. We divide 8 
into the following sets: N is the set of formulae of complexity ::::; n , C is 
the set of conditionals of complexity 11+ 1, NEG is the set of negations of 
complexity n+ 1, CON is the set of conjunctions of complexity 11+ I. D is the 
set of disjunctions of complexity n+l, and Bis the set of necessitations of 
complexity 1i+l. So, G = N U CU NEG U CON U D u B. Looking 
at the proof of lemma 2 again, we know that the antecedent of our condi-
tional gives us r f--- t A. So we can easily weaken with N, C, and NEG. We 
can also weaken with the embedded formulae of conjunctions. disjunctions 
and necessitations of complexity n. From this we c.:an derive the conjunc-
tions and necessitations via L& and LB. So the only potential difficulty 
is weakening with disjunctions of complexity 11. In order to do this, we 
make a list of all the formulae that are the disjuncts of the k elements of 
D: d1.1, dl.2, (h1 ... dk - 1:2 , dk.1 , dk.z, where the first index indicates the 
number of the disjunction from which the fomrnla stems and the second in-
dex indicates whether it is the first or the second disjunct. We take the 2k 
different subsets from this list for which: for each 1 :S n '.S k exactly one 
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of dn.I or dn.2 is in the set and nothing else is in the set. Call these sets 
::::1 ... ::::2 .. Let II = N u C u NEG UCON u Bu r. Thus, for each 
1 ::; m ::; 2k, we get :=:m, II r.- A. We now construct our proof-tree in the 
following way: 
... r.-... . .. r.- ... ... r.- ... .. . r.- ... 
----------- Lv 
du v di.2 ... du, II f--- A ------ ----- Lv du v du ... dJ;.1 , II f--- A 
----------------------~ Lv 
du v d1.2 ... du v d1.:.2, II f--- A 
Since 8 was arbitrary, we have V ti (ti, r f--- A) for tis of complexity 
11+\. D 
Proposition 1 The extension preserl'es reflexivity 
Proof We assume that f--- 0 is reflexive. First, we show, by induction on 
the complexity of a, that Vt::. ~ ifo- (t::.,a f--- a). And by lemma 3, this 
implies that Vt::. ~ jLJ_ (ti, a r.- a) . D 
We now know that the first two of the six points ahovc hold. Before we 
turn to conservativeness, we nectl two more lemmas. 
Lemma 4 If r f---i-' A. then Vt::. E X (6 , r r.- A). 
Proof By induction on proof height, i.e., the number of rule-applications 
in the longest branch of the proof-tree. The proof is, for the most part, 
straightforward. I will leave some minor complications with LC, UN and 
PushUp as an exercise for the reader. D 
Lemmas 3 and 4, when applied to the case where X = P(20). imply 
the followi ng: 
Lemma 5 If r r.-t A, then Vt::. ~ 2 _ (6 , r f--- A). 
With these lemmas in hand, we can show that the extension is conserva-
tive for any underlying consequence relation that obeys ExFF. 
Proposition 2 The extension is a conservative extension of any no11-mo110-
tonic material co11seq11e11ce relation that obeys ExFF; i.e., for all A E 2'0 
and r ~ 2'o. r f---o A if! r f--- A. 
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Proof The left-to-right direction is immediate from Ax I. So we only have 
to show that our construction docs not add any sequent that can be formu-
lated in the base language and is not already in f---0 . We argue by reductio. 
and we look at the (or a) shortest possihle proof of a given violation of con-
servativeness (where length is the number of rule applications in a proof-
tree). If NMM allows a violation of conservativeness, the last step is either 
an application of CCP or of ExFF. After all , the other rules have logical 
connectives in the conclusion-sequent; or else they apply only to quanti !led 
sequents. So we have two cases: 
(Case 1) Assume that the violation, r f-v p, comes by ExFF. The premise 
is r f-v t .L This must come by Ax2 or by UN. If it comes by Ax2, we have 
'v'6.(6., r f---0 .l). But f-vo obeys ExFF by stipu lation. Sor f-v p cannot 
violate conservativeness. Hence, r f-v p must come by UN. The premises 
are f f-v tx .l and r f-v iY 1- and X U Y = P(Yo- ). It l"an be shown by 
induction on proof height that if f contains only atoms and f f-v t X _l_ , then 
'Vil EX (6.,r f---0 .l). Thus, we gel 1::1/:::i. E P(2'0 _) (t::i.,r f-vo.l) . And hy 
ExFF for the underlying consequence relation WC have r f-vo p. 
(Case 2) Assume that the violation comes hy CCP. The premise is r f-v 
A -+ B. This must come by CP or CCP or ExFF. If it comes by CP, the 
premise is f , A f-v B. This violates our assumption that there is no shorter 
proof of r, A f-v B. So. it must come by CCP or ExFF. 
(Case 2.a) Iff f-v A -+ D comes by CCP, the premise is f \ { C} f-v C -+ 
(A -+ B). Since r \ {C} contains only atoms, we are in the same situation 
again: either it must come by CP, CCP, or ExFr. If it comes by CP. we are 
back at r f-v A -+ B. If it comes by CCP, the premise is r \ { C, D} f-v 
D-+ (C-+ (A-+ B)). The same question arises again. ff we continue like 
that. we are launched on an infinite regress of CCP applications. So at some 
point the conditional must come by ExFF. But if one of these conditionals 
comes by ExFF some subset, 8, of r must be persistently incoherent, i.e., 
8 r.-t .l. By lemma 5, 1::1/:::i. ~ £_ (l:::i., 8 f---1-). Since ExFF cannot conclude 
a violation of conservativeness (sec Case 1) and everything in 8 is atomic, 
we have \:/l:::i. (!:::i., 8 f---0 1-). Hence, 1::1/:::i. (6., f ,A f---0 .l). But then ExFF for 
f-vo applies. 
(Case 2.b) r f-v A -t B comes by ExFF. The same reasoning as in rhe 
previous subcase applies. D 
We now know that our extension is well-defined, conservative and that 
it preserves reflexivity. So we can now turn to the last three properties listed 
at the beginning of this section. 
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4.2 Behavior of the conditional, negation, and box 
We want the conditional to express the consequence relation, the negation to 
express incoherence, and the box to express monotonicity. What this comes 
to, for our purposes, is that DT, NT, and BOX hold. 
It is immediate that DT holds. After all, CP gives us the right-to-left 
direction, and CCP gives us the left-to-right-direction. Parenthetically, it 
is worth pointing out the CCP is a simplifying rule. This would lead to 
problems if we wanted to prove Cut-elimination. As I will explain below, 
however, we don't want to do that. 
Regarding negation, we want NT lo hold, i.e., we want: 
Proposition 3 f , A f-vlA=> f f-v -.A. 
Proof The left-to-right direction is immediate because we have RN. So we 
must show that if r f-- -.A, then r , A f--1.. We argue by induction on the 
height of a shortest proof of r f-v -.A. Base case: r f-v -.A comes by the 
application of just one rule. It must come by RN or ExFF. In either case, 
we haver, A f"vl.. Induction step: our hypothesis is that if r f-v -.A can be 
derived in a proof of height n, then r , A f-v l. . For a proof of height n+ 1, the 
last rule applied can be: CCP, RN, L&, Lv, CK, NK, LC, LB, or ExFF. It is 
easy to see that in the cases of RN, ExFF, L&, Lv, CK, NK, and LB we get 
r , A f-v l. in one or two steps. For, either the premise itself is r, A f"v l., or 
we apply the hypothesis to the premise and deriver, A f"vl. with the same 
rule, or we get it by ExFF. So we are left with two cases. 
(Case 1) the last rule applied is CCP. The premise is r \ {B} f-v B -+ 
-.A. If this comes by CP or ExFF, r , A f-vl. is immediate. If it comes by 
CCP, L&, Lv, CK, NK, LC, or LB, this also gives us what we want. As an 
example, suppose it comes by L&. The premise is r \ {B , C&D}, C, D f-v 
B -+ -iA. We can argue thus: 
r \ {B , C&D}, C, D f-v B -+ -,A 
r \ {C&D}, C, D f-v -iA 
r \ {C&D}, c, D , A r- J. Hyp 
f ,A f-v..l L& 
Lv, CK, NK, and LB work in an analogous way. 
CCP 
Next supposer\ {B} f-v B -+ -.A comes by LC. The right premise 
is r \ {C1, ... , Cn , D -+ E}, E f-- B -+ -.A. So, by our hypothesis, 
A, B, f \ {C1, ... , Cn, D -+ E}, E f-vl.. The other premises are: r\ {D-+ 
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E},E f---- D, and r \ {D--+ E},D f---t Ci. and ... , and r \ {D--+ 
E}, D f---t Cn. By lemma 5, the upward arrow implies that we can weaken 
with {A,B}. Hence, A, B , r \ {D--+ E} , E f---i D, and A,B, r \ {D--+ 
E}, D f---t C1, and ... , and A, B, r \ {D --+ E} , D f---t Cn. So by LC, 
r,Af"--l.. 
Supposer \ {B} f--- B --+ -iA comes by CCP. The premise is r \ 
{ B, C} f--- C --+ (B --+ -,A). The reasoning we just went through applies 
again. So CCP cannot conclude a sequent that contradicts our proposition. 
(Case 2) the last rule applied is LC. We apply the same reasoning that 
we applied in the LC subcase of (Case 1). 0 
Finally, we must show that BOX holds. We divide BOX into two parts: 
• r r- DA iffr r-t A. 
• r r-t A iff VL). (b.,r r- A). 
Regarding the second part of BOX, notice that we have already proven both 
directions of this principle as lemmas 2 and 5. So we already know that: 
Proposition 4 Vb. ( b., r f--- A) if! r f---t A. 
Hence, it is just the first part of BOX that still needs to be proven. In 
order to do so, we again first need a lemma. 
Lemma 6 If r f--- Bi -t (B2 ... --+ (Bk --+DA)), then I', Bi ... Bk f---1 
A. 
Proof By induction on proof height of r !--- B1 -+ (B2 ... -+ (Bk -+ 
DA)). The only tricky case is the induction step for LC. It goes as fol-
lows: The premises are r \ { D -+ E} f--- i D, and r \ { C1 , . . . , Cn, D -+ 
E}, D f---1 Ci. ... , r\ {C1, ... , Cn, D --+ E}, D f---i Cn, and I' \ {C1 , ... , 
Cn, D --+ E}, E !--- B1 -+ (B2 ... --+ (B k --+ DA)). By our hypoth-
esis, r \ {C1,. .. ,Cn,D-+ E},E,B1 ... Bk i---- A. By a couple of 
CP application , this gives us r \ {C1 , .. . ,Cn,D-+ E},E f---i Bi -t 
(B2 ... --+ (Bk -+ A)). Together with the other premises, LC allows 
us derive: r f---t B1 -+ (B2 ... -t (Bk -+ A)). And by iterated CCP, 
I',B1 ... B kf--..t A . 0 
We can now prove the first part of our BOX-principle. 
Proposition 5 r f--- DA if! r f---t A. 
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Proof First, the left-lo-right direction. We argue by induction on proof 
height. Base case: The shorcest proof-tree of such a sequent is RB or ExFF 
and both guarantee that r l-'-' 1' A. For the induction step, notice that the last 
step in a proof-tree for r l-'-' DA can be CCP, L&, Lv, CK, NK, LC, RB, 
LB, or ExFF. Lemma 6 gives us the induction step for CCP. The others 
are straightforward and I'll leave them as an exercise for the reader. The 
right-to-left direction is immediate because of RB. 0 
From propositions 5 and 4 the desired BOX follows immediately. Thus, 
we have shown that the extension defined by our sequent rules has all the 
six properties we want it to have. Hence, we have a sequent calculus that is 
in line with logical inferentialism and logical expressivism. 
4.3 Why does cut fail? 
Before I move on to the relation between NMM and intuitionism. I want to 
point out a feature of the system that might seem problematic: the conse-
quence relation r- is not transitive. That is, Cut is not only not provable but it 
actually fails. Monotonicity, transitivity, and reflexivity are often considered 
essential to anything being a consequence relation. Of course, we already 
abandoned that idea when we started to do nonmonotonic logic. But that we 
are also giving up transitivity might seem like a problem. I don't think it is a 
problem. 5 Rather, it is an insight that if you want to have a conditional that 
obeys a deduction theorem in a nonmonotonic setting, you need to give up 
transitivity. 
To see this, take a mixed context version of Cut (Cut-MC): 
Cut·MC 
Proposition 6 Cut-MC together with reflexivity implies that if r r- A. 
thell r, ,6,. r- A. 
Proof We argue thus: 
r, ,6,. , Ar- A r r- A 
r,tJ,. r- A Cut-MC 
The left premise is an instance of reflexivity and, hence, can be derived. 0 
5Davc Ripley ha~ provided some independent motivation to be skeptical <1bout Cut (Ripley. 
2013, 2015; 'cc also Schroeder-Hcbtcr. 200-1-). 
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So you cannot have a mixed context version of CUl in a nonmonotonie 
system with a reflexive consequence relation. 
One might move to a shared context version of CL1t (Cut-SC) to get ri<l 
or this problem. 
f,A f---- B ff----.4. 
ff--- B Cut-SC 
However, if we have a dcdu<.:tion theorem, we can run a similar argument 
for monotonicity with Cut-SC: 
f,A,Bf----A 
- -------CP 
f,Af----B -t A ff----A 
------------- Cut-SC 
f f---- B--7A 
---- ---CCP 
r , B f--- A 
Hence, if you want a nonmonotonic. reflexive const:quence relation with 
a conditional that obeys a deduction theorem, you need to give up Cut-even 
the shared context version. Of course, you can reason by mo<lus tollens at 
this point (see Morgan, 2000). I think, however, that given the plausibility of 
nonmonotonicity and reflexivity and the logical cxpressivist motivation for 
DT, there is good reason to at least investigate systems in which Cut fails 
along with monotonicity. 
There may be particularly well behaved regions of logical space in which 
transitivity holds. And in the fullness of time. we hope 10 study such regions 
systematically and perhaps even to introduce an ohjt:ct language operator 
that lets us mark such regions. Here I just want Lo point out that the failure 
of Cut is not an unmotivated quirk of the NMM system. It is emailed hy the 
properties that I require the system to have. 
5 Relation of NMM to intuitionistic and classical logic 
I want to briefly describe the surprisingly straightforward relation between 
NMM and intuitionistic and classical logic. Due to limitations or space, I 
will omit the proofs of th!! results I am presenting. 
I haw already pointed our that Cut-SC fails in NMM. However, if we 
add Cut-SC to our sequent rules, the NMM rules arc equivalent to Gcntzen ·s 
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sequent rules for intuitionistic logic, LJ, modulo the rules governing the box 
(which is pointless in a monotonic system). Call the system that results 
from adding Cut-SC to the NMM rules the "Cut-System." Moreover, read 
a sequent with .l on the right in the Cut-System as meaning the same as 
a sequent with an empty right side in Gentzen's LJ. Translate all other se-
quents in the obvious way. It can be shown that, under this translation, the 
following holds: 
Proposition 7 Translations of all rules of Gemzen 's LJ system can be de-
rived in the Cut-System, and translations of all rules of the Cut-System that 
don't use the box or sequents quantifying over less than P(2'o) can be de-
rived in Gentzen 's LJ. 
In effect, the Cut-System without the apparatus governing the box is 
equivalent to Gentzen's LJ. This does not only hold at the level of sequent 
rules, but also at the level of theorems. All the theorems of intuitionistic 
logic are theorems of the Cut-System, i.e., they are implied by the empty 
sel. Given these facts, it is easy to see that the following holds: 
Proposition 8 If the underlying material consequence relation contains 
all and only instances of reflexivity and we ignore the box (by deleting RB 
and LB), the (non-quantified) consequence relation of tire Cut-System coin-
cides with tire intuitio11istic consequence relatio11. 
Since the Cut-System gives us intuitionism, it is clear that adding double 
negation elimiation to the Cut-System will give us classical logic. It is easy 
to add sequent rules that give us double negation elimination. Hence, clas-
sical logic can be recovered by adding Cut and such further sequent rules 
to NMM. In this sense, the system I have presented can be viewed as a 
"mother-logic" that gives rise to intuitionism or classical logic under special 
circumstances. 
6 Conclusion 
I have presented a way of extending a nonmonotonic material consequence 
relation over an atomic base language to a consequence relation over a logi-
cally complex language. The extension is conservative; it preserves reflexiv-
ity; the conditional tracks the consequence relation; the negation tracks the 
incoherence property; and a new kind of modal operator tracks local regions 
of monotonicity. Thus, I have presented a logical system that does justice to 
the philosophical ideas of logical inferentialism and logical expressivism. 
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